The question, therefore, is whether there is a case that can serve the purposes of a manipulative argument: a case in which the victim does not have freedom, which is a necessary condition for moral responsibility, while he is in no way different from a normal agent under normal circumstances in a deterministic world (that is, from someone, which we believe acts freely and is morally responsible for what he does). Second-nature arguments focus on the notion of choice. Having a choice, it seems, is to have real options or alternatives – different ways of acting. The concern is that determinism means that what we do is always the only thing we can do, and so we never really have a choice about anything instead of being under the (perhaps inevitable) illusion that we have a choice. Someone who argues in favor of incompatibility in this way can admit that the truth of determinism corresponds to our choices, at least in the sense that a dog or a small child makes decisions and also with our decisions that are causally effective. But, she insists, this is not enough for free will; We have free will only if we have a real choice about the actions we do and we have no real choice unless there is more than one action we can perform. Compatibilists argue that mental reality in itself is not causally effective.   Classical compatibilists have approached the dilemma of free will by arguing that free will applies as long as we are not limited or forced from the outside.  Modern compatibilists distinguish between freedom of will and freedom of action, that is: separate freedom of choice from freedom to implement it.  Since all men feel a sense of free will, some modern compatibilists believe that it is necessary to take this intuition into account.   Compatibilists often associate freedom of will with the ability to make rational decisions.
Baumeister and colleagues found that provoking disbelief in free will seems to have various negative effects. . . .